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It is now clear US Army Major Nidal Hasan had a series of connections to the Islamist cleric, Anwar al-Awlaki . For those of us who have studied, with increasing concern, the extreme teachings of this cleric, this tragedy is the inevitable consequence of un-checked Islamist radicalisation. This situation has been made all the more distressing by the apparent lack of concern shown by the US Intelligence and Military authorities in taking Awlaki’s influence seriously.

Even before Major Nidal had fired a single bullet in Fort Hood, the US authorities knew about his increasingly vocal radicalisation and that he had attended the Dar al-Hijrah mosque in Virgina at the time Awlaki was its head Imam. Nidal had also been the subject of an FBI investigation after it was discovered that he made communication with Awlaki by email. There was certainly no lack of overt clues.

Inayat Bunglawala is right to say that most Islamic scholars, particularly in Britain, are opponents of the extremist fighting talk that is replete in Awlaki’s sermons. Even within political Islam, Awlaki’s teachings fall within the most extreme, Al Qaeda-aligned territory. Indeed, according to Charles E. Allen, the US Under Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis and Chief Intelligence Officer, Awlaki is the former spiritual leader to three of the 9/11 hijackers. He was also identified by the 9/11 Commission report as having provided advice to two of the 9/11 hijackers, Khaled Almihdar and Nawaf Alhazmi.

What should concern us most, however, is this. Awlaki has a huge internet following amongst Muslims, all over the world. His sermons, delivered in word perfect English and Arabic, are downloaded and shared by vast numbers of people in the Middle East and in the West. On his blog, which has now been taken down, his articles together with the stories of his scrapes with the FBI and his incarceration in Yemen, have earned him the status as the pre-eminent crossover Arabic-speaking theoretician of armed Jihad. 

Most disturbingly of all, Awlaki has been actively promoted by some of the United Kingdom’s most prominent Islamist organisations. Inayat Bunglawala’s description of Awlaki’s relationship with these organisations is an understatement of the seriousness of the problem. There are two points that are central to Bunglawala’s discussion of Awlaki’s connection in the UK. The first is that when Islamic organisations began inviting Awlaki to this country in the late 1990s, Awlaki was then still a mainstream, moderate imam with sensible views and showed “no hint of his later extremism”. The second, that Awlaki only became radicalised due to the US war against Iraq in 2003, and is therefore somehow the product of Western foreign policy. However, under greater scrutiny, neither of these claims stand up, even from the data available in the public domain on Awlaki.

A Washington Post report examined tax records from as early as 1998, which showed that Awlaki served as vice president of a charity (CSSW) founded by his then patron Abdul Majeed al-Zindani, a Yemeni politician who is named as an associate of Al-Qaeda. The CSSW has been described a “front organization to funnel money to terrorists”. The FBI also know that he was paid a visit in 2000 by an associate of Omar Abdel Rahman, known as the blind sheikh, who was convicted in connection with the 1993 World Trade Center bombing. The report also states that in 1999, Awlaki was investigdated by the FBI “when it learnt that he may have been visited by a “procurement agent” for bin Laden”.

In late 2002, Awlaki made a trip back to the USA, where he visited Ali al-Timimi, who was the time was accused by US prosecutors of recruiting Muslims to fight against US troops in Afghanistan. Timimi was convicted in 2005 and is now serving a life sentence for inciting followers to fight with the Taliban against Americans.

Inayat Bunglawala refers to an interview of Awlaki in the National Geographic from 2001, in which Awlaki’s responses are portrayed as reasonable and moderate. But what the interview doesn’t tell us is that in reality Awlaki had already been investigated twice by the FBI for his connections with Al-Qaeda. He was on his best behaviour. When Awlaki conducted another interview with IslamOnline – the website founded by the Muslim Brotherhood’s spiritual leader, Yusuf al-Qaradawi – he suggested that Mossad were behind the 9/11 attacks.

Therefore, by the time Awlaki was first invited to the UK by British Islamic organisations, he was, even by the Islamist standards, no moderate scholar. His actions show that he was a well known activist with a highly confrontational message for the cause of violent Jihad, long before the second Gulf War.

But it is what happened from 2002 onwards that is more important in the UK context. Since that date, Awlaki has been invited to speak in person, or via video link-up, by a large number of private Muslim organisations, university Islamic societies and registered charities which have benefited from government funding. They have promoted him, in spite of or perhaps because of, Awlaki’s track record and his increasingly explicit message exhorting Muslims to support violent Jihad.

Timeline

In June 2003, the Muslim Association of Britain (MAB), referred to as the official arm of the Muslim Brotherhood in the UK, organised a series of meetings with Awalki as guest speaker. 

Later that year, at an event organised by the East London Mosque (ELM) in December 2003, Awlaki addressed Muslims on the subject of terrorism arrests in the UK and urged them to never report on or turn over their fellow Muslims, under any circumstances. Two months prior in October 2003, the Islamic Forum Europe (IFE), an organisation closely associated with the ELM, invited Awlaki to speak at its ‘expoislamia’ event. In January 2009, the same ELM hosted  another event, entitled ‘The End of Time’, with Awlaki this time as delivering a video message. In spite of the fact that Awlaki’s “presence” at the event was reported in the national press, ELM refused to condemn Awlaki’s ideology or even cancel the meeting.

As late as 2005 Inayat Bunglawala and Awlaki were both listed as co- supporter of an organisation called ‘Stop Political Terror’ (SPT) which aimed to protect the civil rights of Muslims charged with extremism. One of individuals that SPT campaigned for was Babar Ahmad, who ran Azzam Publications, a pro-jihad website which, according to his indictment was “used to recruit individuals to be mujahideen and to solicit and raise funds and assistance for jihad”.

Osama Saeed, who now is poised to represent the Scottish National Party (SNP) for Glasgow Central in Parliament, wrote in his blog in 2006:

“Imam Anwar Al-Awlaki was originally hounded in the US because two of the 9/11 bombers happened to pray at his mosque. Many of my Muslim readers will either know him personally or have heard his lectures. He preached nothing but peace, and I pray he will be able to do so again.”

Saeed continues to cling on to the falsehood that Awlaki was a moderate when he praised his message of “nothing but peace” three years ago. He also references the National Geographic interview as proof of Awlaki’s moderateness, the citation of which is fast becoming the favoured get-out route for Islamists who want to justify their support of Awlaki.

Azad Ali is a civil servant in HM Treasury. He is the President of the Civil Service Islamic Society and sits on the council of Liberty. In January 2009, the Mail on Sunday reported Mr Ali’s extreme Islamist views in entries he had written on the IFE’s blog, ‘Between the Lines’ on which he has gushed about his “love” for the “Sheikh”, and then went on to justify Awlaki’s view that American Muslims who voted in elections were people who had “humiliated themselves by voting for candidates who have no serious concern for their issues”.

One of the directors of the MAB, Anas Altikriti, is now with the Cordoba Foundation which sponsored an event this summer in the Kensington and Chelsea Town Hall called ‘Beyond Guantanamo’ that was to feature an online video address by Awlaki.

Cage Prisoners (CP) is a successor organisation to Stop Political Terror, which also campaigns for Muslims who have been detained or imprisoned. They are also the most active supporters of Awlaki in the UK today. The CP website contains an extensive and friendly interview between Awlaki and Moazzam Begg, one of its directors and a former Guantanamo detainee. In August 2009, CP were the organisers of an event in the Kensington and Chelsea Town Hall in which guests were promised the treat of a live video link-up with Awlaki, who the CP regard as an “Inspirational Imam”. In the weeks before the event, CP were informed by the local council that their event could only go ahead if they cancelled the video address by Awlaki. CP complied with this, although they issued a statement on their site which refused to acknowledge Awlaki’s extremist nature.

The notion that Awlaki was previously a moderate imam whose public and personal journey to the extremes of violent Islamism happened relatively recently and long after British organisations endorsed and supported him is a false one. There are a host of organisations and individuals who operate within the Islamist landscape in this country who have, at one point or another, praised or defended Awlaki. I have listed only some of the British organisations which will have been aware of Awlaki’s views. Many of their leaders will have pored over every word and inflection he made in his articles and sermons. They will have been supporters of Awlaki’s rhetoric because of his message of violent Jihad and not in spite of it.

The US authorities are not the only ones who have been slow in responding to their own intelligence on Awlaki. British institutions have been equally lethargic, sometimes even supportive, in responding to organisations and individuals who have embraced and endorsed the ideology of Awlaki in their campaigns, seminars, public meetings and broadcasts. Whereas people who have pointed out the dangerous potential of Awlaki have been allowed to be defamed as Muslim-haters or self-loathing Muslim hypocrites.

Although the leadership of the Awlaki-supporting organisations cannot have mistaken him for a moderate, the same does not necessarily hold true for their rank and file. Ordinary Muslims, turning up at events at which Awlaki was promoted, may well have taken on trust the assertion that he is a religious authority with prodigious qualifications and a sincere and important message. It is these ordinary members who have been imperilled, by being exposed to jihadi theology in its purest form. They have been betrayed by their leadership.

The supporters of these organisations need to think long and hard about how their leadership came to champion Awlaki. We must also give serious consideration to the question on whether the leadership of these organisations should be trusted in the future.

God willing, the nuclear weapons will not fall into the hands of the Americans and the mujahideen would take them and use them against the Americans

Oh no…

Interviewed by Al-Jazeera, Abu al-Yazid also commented on AQ’s future strategy:

The strategy of the … organisation in the coming period is the same as in the previous period: to hit the head of the snake, the head of tyranny — the United States.

That can be achieved through continued work on the open fronts and also by opening new fronts in a manner that achieves the interests of Islam and Muslims and by increasing military operations that drain the enemy financially.

i.e. to revive AQ’s unit in the Middle East by naming Abu Basir al-Wahayshi as the new leader to campaign AQ’s cause in Saudi Arabia.

Good luck Saudi.

Abu al-Yazid further added AQ would only ever accept a 10 year truce where the US would have to agree to stop backing Israel and pro-Western governments in Muslim majority countries as well as to withdrawing its troops from those countries.

Never.

“I was encouraged by the university’s obvious commitment to ensure that the students have sufficient expertise and knowledge to stand in the way of violent extremism.”

Earlier this month, US Defense Secretary Robert Gates was equally impressed with Saudi Arabia’s rehabilitation program for former militants and its newfound committment to tackling anti-extremism at home and has been helping Pakistan in its efforts to contain the Taliban insurgency there.

All very good but this seems to be trotting out some anodyne line on Saudi Arabia merely for diplomatic reasons. But why the kudos now being heaped on the Saudis? Possibly because the US are considering sending the Yemeni detainees of Guantanamo Bay to Saudi Arabia as part of Washington’s intentions to close down the detention centre. The Saudis have had much success lately in tackling its homegrown jihadi cells and al Qaeda franchises. The Saudi’s appetite for tackling extremism has seen great improvements after al Qaeda attacked Saudi Arabia twice in 2003. Three factors contribute to this success:

1) The orthodox Wahhabi establishment of government scholars are completely integrated with the political insitiutions of the royal family. This historic Saudi-Wahhabi alliance with its monarchist scholars have long provided the Saudi royal establishment with religious legitimacy.

2) The power of the strong tribal structures which pay deference to the Sauds is normative.

3) The Saudis have vast amounts of petro-dollars at their disposal for throwing at disgruntled Islamists and money is known to be a strong de-radicalisation tool

But can we be sure that Saudi Arabia is wholly committed to fighting Islamist radicalism?

The jihadist threat within the kingdom remains, but a combination of unique circumstances enabled Saudi Arabia to make considerable progress on the home front. Fears still exist that because of the ultraconservative religious nature of the state, the monarchy might fall and be replaced by a radical regime — especially as the kingdom enters an extended period of transition. But for now, the Saudi situation is stable to the point where the Saudis can look beyond their borders and offer help to other jihadist trouble spots.

The success of Saudi Arabian anti-extremists strategies so highly regarded lately by Sadiq Khan and Robert Gates do not bear up to scrutiny. The levels of state financing of al Qaeda have always been regarded as an open secret.

WASHINGTON — Saudi Arabia remains the world’s leading source of money for Al Qaeda and other extremist networks and has failed to take key steps requested by U.S. officials to stem the flow, the Bush administration’s top financial counter-terrorism official said Tuesday.

The numbers of al Qaeda extremists are decreasing in Saudi Arabia not so much because of de-radicalisation as simply because they are moving out and setting up in Sanaa in neighbouring Yemen. The Yemen Soldiers Brigade, an al Qaeda franchise, is bulging with new recruits from Saudi Arabia:

The announcement also provided links to downloadable versions of the latest issue of the group’s online magazine, Sada al-Malahim, (Arabic for “The Echo of Battle”). The Web page links provided to download the magazine also featured trailers advertising the pending release of a new video from the group, now referred to by its new name, al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula.

The translated name of this new organization sounds very similar to the old Saudi al Qaeda franchise, the al Qaeda Organization in the Arabian Peninsula (in Arabic, “Tandheem al Qaeda fi Jazeerat al-Arabiyah”). But the new group’s new Arabic name, Tanzim Qa’idat al-Jihad fi Jazirat al-Arab, is slightly different. The addition of “al-Jihad” seems to have been influenced by the Iraqi al Qaeda franchise, Tanzim Qaidat al-Jihad fi Bilad al-Rafidayn. The flag of the Islamic State of Iraq also appears in the Jan. 24 video, further illustrating the deep ties between the newly announced organization and al Qaeda in Iraq. Indeed, a number of Yemeni militants traveled to Iraq to fight, and these returning al Qaeda veterans have played a large part in the increased sophistication of militant attacks in Yemen over the past year.

Saudi Arabia’s links with extremism and jihadism in Pakistan and Afghanistan continues unabated. However, the Saudi model for receding the influence of jihadi cells does not necessarily translate to Pakistan, Afghanistan or other South Asian countries let alone Europe:

On the religious front, Afghanistan and Pakistan lack religious establishments. Instead, they both have highly fragmented religious landscapes consisting of rival Islamist groups, competing Sunni sects and networks of madrassas. Even the two countries’ more mainstream ulema are divided into various groups. Unlike in Saudi Arabia and (to a lesser degree) Yemen, only a tiny minority adheres to Salafist/Wahhabi Islam in Southwest Asia. Even so, the Deobandis (the sect of the Taliban and other Islamist militant groups) are a growing movement, posing a challenge to the Shia and the majority Barelvis (a South Asian form of Sufi Islam).

More recently in the USA, a suit has been filed by several insurance companies who are looking to recover over $300 billion for losses incurred in the 9/11 attacks. In the case of the Fedeal Insurance Co vs Saudi Arabia, the following Saudi princes have been named as defendents:

* Prince Salman bin Abdulaziz al-Saud, president of SHC, who was warned in 2000 of his organization’s ties to al Qaeda;
* Crown Prince Sultan bin Abdulaziz al-Saud, the designated successor to King Abdullah, who received warnings as early as 1994 that some Muslim charitable groups were fronts for al Qaeda;
* Prince Naif bin Abdulaziz al-Saud, who as Saudi Minister of the Interior monitors and controls the charities operating in Saudi Arabia;
* Prince Turki al-Faisal bin Abdulaziz al-Saud, who was the director of the Kingdom’s Department of General Intelligence (“DGI”) until August 2001; and
* Prince Mohamed al Faisal al Saud, who unlike the other princes named is not a government official but a bank manager alleged to have knowingly provided material sponsorship to international terrorism.

Saudi Arabia’s successes in rolling back religious radicalism at home are the result of a perfect storm of certain unique circumstances that simply do not exist in more troubling jihadist hot spots like Afghanistan and Pakistan or indeed amongst Islamist radicals in Britain. Complimenting the Saudis on their initiatives makes for pleasant diplomatic table talk, but politicians like Sadiq Khan should in addition, be putting public pressure on Saudi Arabia for its continued funding of international Islamist radicalism which have direct effects and repurcussions within Southasian communities in the UK.

The Art of Recruitment

Since its ‘publication’ last year, users have been able to download a PDF called A Course in the Art of Recruitment, by the suitably named Abu-Amr al-Qaidi (al-Qaidi means ‘of al-Qaeda’), after it was made available on various jihadi websites.

The 51-page Arabic manual has been described by Brian Fishman and Abdullah Warius in the CTC Sentinel as a guide “designed to provide less-skilled jihadist recruiters operating independently of any cohesive terrorist organization the tools to effectively recruit secular and moderate Muslims into the global jihadist movement.”

Although we do not know for sure whether the techniques explained in the book are being actively applied by al-Qaeda franchises to harvest fresh recruits, it does however provide an insiders look into the, thankfully, difficult practices used to turn individuals into violent jihadis.

The manual breaks down the process into five stages for would-be recruiters of less experienced terror groups to navigate the difficulties of grooming individuals into jihadists:

Stage One: Acquaintance and Selection
Abu `Amr argues that a recruiter’s first job is to identify a suitable recruitment target. He advises recruiters to select “an old friend or a relative who happens to be not committed to Islam. Or close to your age or close to your accommodation.” Abu `Amr is critical of jihadists who only want to recruit religious people. Indeed, he warns against recruiting “Salafists and memorizers of the Qur’an” because “most Salafists hold opinions opposing to al-Qa`ida that were fed to them by their scholars.” Likewise, Abu `Amr does not trust memorizers of the Qur’an and believes that many of them are spies. He also warns against recruiting certain types of professionals, including scientists and military officials, because they are not amenable to al-Qa`ida’s message. Abu `Amr does not exclude recruiting religious people, but he focuses on secular individuals because they are more common and can generally be approached without alerting security services.

Stage Two: Building a Relationship
According to Abu `Amr, a recruiter should build a close, friendly relationship with recruits before raising political or ideological issues. He instructs recruiters to invite recruits for lunch, send them text messages, and give them gifts. Since every recruit requires personal attention, recruiters are told to only target two people at a time. According to Abu `Amr, it is important to urge recruits to embrace the ritual obligations of Islam as a way to increase their sense of obedience, writing:

The issues that you will talk about at this stage are what we call the refining issues, meaning that you try to remedy his passiveness and make him love the path of obedience and make him perform prayers on time, but nothing more than this so you will not burden or rush him.

Stage Three: Faith Awakening
In stage three, recruiters are urged to awaken passive religious sentiment in recruits. Recruiters are advised to tread carefully and avoid demanding “perfection or full commitment; you should progress gradually.” During this stage, recruiters should make recruits seriously consider the pleasures of heaven and the torment of hell. Abu `Amr argues that this dichotomy is a powerful motivator, explaining that radicalization “normally happens to those who fear the torment of the afterlife and who come to know that jihad is the salvation from eternal damnation. The result is that jihad is desired and craved.”

During stage three of the program, recruiters should ensure their recruits watch videos of Usama bin Ladin and Ayman al-Zawahiri and focus on identifying and fixing any of the recruit’s shubhat (suspicions). For example, Abu `Amr says that many Muslims blame jihadists for provoking both illustrations of the Prophet Muhammad in the Western press and the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq. Such shubhat, even if they reflect hatred of the West, are disruptive to the recruitment process. Abu `Amr urges recruiters to address them immediately, saying, “Know my beloved brother that one suspicion only is enough to move people off the road, particularly in the beginning.”

Abu `Amr is particularly concerned about shubhat related to the rulers of Islamic states, and refers to Ibn Abbas’ argument that “there is a Kufr that is less than another Kufr.”

Ibn Abbas argued that a ruler who does not apply Shari`a should not be considered an infidel—and therefore should remain immune from attack—if he applies different rules out of ignorance or if he believes in his heart that the Islamic Shari`a is the right path yet does not know how to apply it correctly. Ibn Abbas’ concept directly contradicts Ibn Taymiyya’s more expansive understanding of takfiriyya—denouncing a Muslim, including the ruler of a state, as an infidel—that is popular with jihadists.

Stage Four: Implanting Jihadist Concepts
The purpose of stage four is to instill jihadist interpretations of traditional Islamic concepts in recruits. Abu `Amr highlights five concepts that are particularly important:
1. Adherence to the book (Qur’an) and the sunna.
2. The religious duty of jihad and the necessity to be prepared.
3. The acceptability of takfiriyya.
4. Democracy is a religion and participation in elections is unacceptable.
5. The concept of al-wala’ wa’l-bara’ (loyalty and disavowal).

Abu `Amr understands that the average recruiter will not be a theologian. Rather than master complex ideological arguments themselves, recruiters are urged to instruct recruits to use classic jihadist texts to explain and substantiate critical ideas. Among others, Abu `Amr recommends several classic jihadist writings, including `Abdullah `Azzam’s “Liberation of Muslim Lands,” the biography of Abu’l-Walid al-Ansari, the fatwa of Shaykh al-Shaykh on illegitimate rulers, and Abu Basir al-Tartusi’s “Islamic Ruling on Democracy and Multiplicity of Parties.” In addition to reading these texts, Abu `Amr recommends that recruiters teach recruits to download jihadist media and correspond on web forums. In general, however, Abu `Amr’s approach to jihadist media is very cautious; he urges recruiters to only show recruits videos when they are in a contemplative mood and are willing to internalize the political message of the propaganda.

Abu `Amr is adamant that recruits accept jihadist ideological doctrine in its entirety, and eschew all other interpretations of Islamic concepts. He argues that doubts and confusion of any kind are disastrous to the effective radicalization of a recruit. Abu `Amr is particularly concerned that new jihadists will be dismayed if their fellow fighters commit illegitimate acts, which presumably refers to the killing of Muslims in places such as Iraq and Algeria. To allay this problem, he explains that recruits must understand that their only true relationship is with God; fighters should maintain their relationships with flawed jihadists but focus on their personal religious commitment rather than worldly concerns.

Stage Five: Formation of a Cell
Forming a cell is the fifth and final stage of Abu `Amr’s recruitment course. The fifth stage begins when the recruiter is convinced that a recruit has accepted the principles of jihadist ideology and truly desires violent jihad. Abu `Amr argues that these newly radicalized recruits are ready to read Abu Mus`ab al-Suri’s book The Global Islamic Resistance Call and suggests that al-Suri’s concept of decentralized “individual jihad” is appropriate for the current struggle. Recruiters are to urge recruits to wage jihad in their home country, but to expect that recruits may be unwilling to do so and will be more interested in traveling to Iraq or Afghanistan. Abu `Amr explains that recruits are emotionally drawn to high-profile jihads and must be convinced that it is religiously legitimate and strategically wise to fight at home.

The shear quantity of reading and video material that would-be jihadis needs to work through to pass the stages to full-blown al-Qaeda operative is certainly not trivial. The reading list contains all the classics: Abdullah Azzam’s Liberation of Muslim Lands, much beloved by even non-violent Islamists, is a must read for recruits. The Global Islamic Resistance Call by Abu Mus’ab al-Suri, is saved till last. If anyone has read this text, I would love to know why it has been saved for last.

Most unreassuringly, the recruit is urged to “fight at home” although Abu-Amr is well aware, for a jihadi rookie, Iraq or Afghanistan will probably be on top of the list of destinations after having made it through all five stages of indoctrination.

[M]embers of terrorist cells tend to be young men with little religious knowledge other than a few cut-and-paste lines from the rockstars of jihadi literature, like radical Egyptian cleric Sayed Qutb. In comparison to such founding fathers of modern Islamic terrorism, this generation has suffered no serious repression.

He also argues, on the back of research from McGill University, that:

Ultimately it is not the ideas of al Qaeda that need dismantling; it is the idea of al Qaeda. This is tough. As has been proved by counterproductive anti-drug warnings, anything government proscribes can become more exciting for young people. The key is to strip al Qaeda of its mystique, and show that the average day of an Islamic extremist is more like that of a petty criminal than a secret agent. (This happens to be true: seven out of ten European militants in al Qaeda training camps return home because of tough training and being treated like skivvies.)

Another route is to poke fun, an idea touched on in Michael Waller’s underappreciated 2007 book Fighting the War of Ideas like a Real War. After all, the Ku Klux Klan lost members when a children’s magazine mocked it. Instead of describing violent extremists as “operatives”; let’s drop the Bondisms and focus on the blunders that permeate terrorism plots. Surveillance of the “Toronto 18” cell in Canada revealed that the plotters could not even name the prime minister they were planning to attack. Sharp-eyed British satirist Chris Morris is said to be planning a feature film on Islamic extremism. He could well achieve more than the hawks and the doves combined.

Bartlett has a point about the Bondisms, remember this interview:

And mocking your enemies is a tried and tested strategy, its transposition to the war on terror could be interesting. Maybe Chris Morris has something like this planned?

It’s not like there’s a lack of material. There have been “chapati bombs“, bombers forgetting essential kit and even a bomb plot defeated by the efficiency of London’s traffic wardens.

But Bartlett is making a more serious point. He is suggesting, as he has before, that to defeat terrorism we need to reduce its “glamour.”

In April 2008 he wrote that we shouldn’t necessarily jail people who incite terrorism:

[W]e should think carefully before locking people like this up, and recognise that a balance needs to be struck between punishing those who transgress what we as a society feel is acceptable, without unnecessarily adding to the glamour and legitimacy of the ideas they put forward. On this occasion, we might be better off publicising widely what they’ve said, and let them be ridiculed and treated with the contempt they deserve.

A little later that year he wrote this:

Al Qaeda is no longer a religious terrorist network, it’s a brand – and the suicide bomber video, guaranteed a million hits on YouTube, provides a handy shortcut on the arduous path from anonymity to stardom.

He has expanded on these views in “Wicked Jihad“, a publication available on the Demos website. In it he proposes three “often overlooked” explanations for the appeal of violent extremism:

- it offers a sense of adventure
- it gives a sense of personal agency
- it wins street credibility

Bartlett provides an original perspective, but I’m also reminded somewhat of one of Jon Stewart’s finer moments:

Yes, some who turn to terrorism are seeking glamour, a sense of personal agency and street credibility but, like Stewart asks, aren’t all youth?

The ideas Bartlett expresses in these articles are an interesting starting point for research, but some fairly fundamental questions remain unanswered. Like why have some Muslim youths gone to Afghanistan to seek adventure when most youths, Muslim and not, have sought it by going to casinos, theme parks or nightclubs? Why have some Muslim youth sought glamour in violent extremism when most other youth take drugs or start a band? And isn’t carrying a knife or learning judo an easier way to acquire “a sense of personal agency” and win “street credibility” than joining a terror network?

Not that I’m endorsing knife crime as a way to combat terrorism, it’s just that there must be a few other factors which govern why common desires and emotions have provoked wildly different responses amongst British youth. Unfortunately, as far as I can tell, Bartlett hasn’t developed upon this idea yet.

I would also like to see a little more evidence before I agree to equate the psychological circumstances of somebody who threatens me with a knife and steals my mobile phone with those of somebody who blows himself up on a tube train along with dozens of other people. And is it really possible that a desire for “adventure” is a satisfactory explanation both for why I used to go pot-holing in Yorkshire and for why a lad from Leeds went for arms-training in Afghanistan?

Whilst the concept of “dismantling [...] the idea of al Qaeda” is attractive, I remain unconvinced that this can or should occur without attempting to dismantle its ideas. If seven out of ten Europeans who travelled to al-Qa’ida camps in Afghanistan returned home because of their disenchantment with the reality of life as a trainee terrorist then this still left three out of ten who were happy to bear the deprivations for the sake of their “studies”. This is not an acceptable situation.

Bartlett has some interesting proposals which should be researched further, but what he suggests should surely complement, rather than replace, combating the violent and Islamist ideas which lie at the core of al-Qa’ida’s ideology? Once these have been defeated then questions of “glamour” and “adventure” will be immaterial.

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This is cross posted from Harry’s Place.